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THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE'S ATTEMPT TO
RESOLVE THE INSURANCE CRISIS: TOO MUCH
TORT REFORM AND TOO LITTLE INSURANCE

REGULATION
On September 26, 1986, Governor Thompson signed into law
Senate Bill 1200, entitled "An Act in Relation to the Insurance Crisis" (Act).1 The purpose of the Act was to increase the availability of
insurance at reasonable rates for local governments, businesses and
citizens of Illinois.2 The Act was also supposed to alleviate the
"hardships" that insurance companies face and to permit them to
remain in the industry.8 The Act sought to achieve its purposes
through a combination of tort reform and insurance regulation.4
The Act contains several articles that are necessary to reform
the tort system and to regulate the insurance industry, but does not
contain the essential reforms that would quell the insurance crisis.,
Those who expect an increase in the availability of insurance and a
decrease in insurance rates will be severely disappointed. Conversely, the insurance industry will benefit because its currently excessive profits will continue to grow.'
This comment first defines the insurance crisis 7 and presents
1. An Act in relation to the insurance crisis, Pub. L. No. 84-1431 (1986) (CCH).
The various articles in the Act are now codified in the Local Government, Civil Procedures and Insurance Chapters of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
2. 84th Gen. Assembly, Illinois, House of Representatives Transcript Debates,
June 30, 1986 at 5 (statement of Rep. Grieman).
3. The insurance industry feared that it had lost 5.5 billion dollars nationwide
in 1985. See Effron, Insurers Defend Figures of 1985 Losses, L.A.D.J., p.5 col. 1, Jan.
14, 1986. This figure is disputed, and other statistics establish that the industry is
more profitable than ever. See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these statistics. The insurance industry also claims that there has been a 47 billion
dollar increase in claims over the past five years. See Insurance Wars Vexing the
States, Chi. D. L. Bull., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter Insurance Wars]. The
reason industry figures are disputed is due to the fact that much of its information is
not made available to the public. See Simon, Keynote Address: AUerton House Conference on Tort Damages, 75 ILL. B.J. 132-33 (1986).
4. See infra notes 89-107 and accompanying text for the specific civil procedure
and insurance statutes enacted by the legislature.
5. See infra notes 145-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the insurance regulations enacted by this Act.
6. See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the insurance
companies' profits.
7. See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text for the symptoms and effects of
the insurance crisis.
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several different theories posited for its cause.' Next, this comment
sets forth and explains the eight major articles of the Act.9 This
comment then demonstrates that tort reform will not resolve the insurance crisis. It critiques the articles of this Act and suggests modifications."0 Finally, this comment presents proposals which would effectively quell the insurance crisis."
I. BACKGROUND
The Insurance Crisis
The entire country is experiencing an insurance crisis. The
symptoms giving rise to this crisis include exorbitant insurance
rates, shortages in liability coverage and arbitrary cancellation of
policies. s The crisis affects every sector of society: businesses, local
governments and individuals. When rates increase, many small businesses, educational facilities and municipalities are especially unable
to obtain liability coverage.14 The crisis does not end here. Instead,
this lack of attainable coverage triggers a "domino" effect. For example, educational facilities have been forced to discontinue extracurricular activities, and municipalities have had to close public
parks and eliminate citizen services. 5 Consequently, children, senior
8. See infra notes 27-59 and accompanying text for the divergent theories on
the causation of the insurance crisis.
9. See infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text for an explanation of the reforms in this act.
10. See infra notes 80-115 and accompanying text for critique of the tort and
insurance reforms in this act.
11. See infra notes 127-150 and accompanying text for proposals that would
quell the insurance crisis.
12. For example, as of October 1985, Sacramento could only find one policy to
cover its liability insurance at a cost of 640 thousand dollars. This cost was four times
more than the year before and twelve times more than the year before that. Too
Much for Too Little, L.A.D.J., Aug. 5, 1986, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Too Much for
Too Little]. The Sacramento school district's insurance cost two and a half times
more in 1985 than it did in 1984 for less than half of its coverage. Id. Thousands of
professionals, including attorneys in West Virginia, received policy cancellations right
before a new law went into effect that would place restrictions on such cancellations.
Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 1. Florida had to cut back insurance rates by 40%.
Id. at 10. Washington rejected 160 rate increase requests. Id. North Carolina, New
York and Hawaii all enacted insurance regulation to fight the crisis. Id. Thirty-three
states enacted some sort of tort reform and 14 states instituted insurance regulations.
Id. In August 1986, the President and Congress sponsored a conference for small
businesses to discuss solutions to alleviate the crisis. See Insurance Dominates Business Session, Chi. D. L. Bull., Aug. 21, 1986, at 3, col. 2 [hereinafter Insurance Dominates Business Session].
13. See Marovitz, Insurance Crisis Could Be Solved By Industry Reform, Chi.
D. L. Bull., May 14, 1986, at 2, col. 1. See also Quinn, Does Illinois Need a Consumer
Insurance Board?, Chi. D. L. Bull., Nov. 22, 1985, at-3, col. 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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citizens and others who depend on local government suffer."0 When
businesses have to close their doors, the whole economy suffers.
Recent statistics establish that insurance costs are harshly impacting consumers. 17 Many public transportation systems are experiencing rate increases from 500% to 1000%."s Most architectural
and engineering firms' rates have compounded by 200% and
300%."s Indeed, the smaller architectural and engineering firms cannot obtain insurance coverage. 0 Municipalities are also operating
without coverage.2 ' For example, one small Illinois town, which receives six thousand dollars in revenue, has a liability premium of
fifty-six hundred dollars.2 2 A hospital in Illinois went without coverage when it discovered its liability premium cost eight-hundred
thousand dollars for one million dollars in coverage.2 3 Moreover, a
major corporation's premium jumped in one year from five-hundred
thousand dollars to thirty million dollars.2 4
The insurance industry, trial lawyers, businesses and politicians
have all advanced theories about what caused this insurance crisis.
One theory is that the insurance industry manufactured the crisis
through its investment practices and manipulation of consumers.2
The contraposition is that the crisis emanated from the tort system;
namely, that the liability standards and doctrines have eroded the
tort system, thus causing a large increase in lawsuits and damage
awards. 20 The last theory speculates that the crisis is a result of a
combination of factors stemming from both of the foregoing
theories.
16. E.g., Transcript Debates, 84th Gen. Ass., 23-24, June 30, 1986 (statement of
Rep. Tate) [hereinafter Tate]. Tate observed that the crisis has cost Illinois consumers their jobs and livelihoods and has deprived them of their right to put food on
their tables. Id. at 23. He stated that citizens have been deprived of their right to
enjoy public parks and deprived of local government services. Id. at 23-24.
17. In late 1985, a Chamber of Commerce study showed that the cost of property and casualty insurance increased an average of 97%. See Quinn, supra note 13,
at. 3. A California company, Lahr Electric Motors, had their insurance cost increase
by 450%. See Insurance Dominates Business Session, supra note 12, at 3. The company's liability insurance premiums for 1986 equaled its profits in 1985. Id.
18. Task Force Findings, 75 ILL. B.J. 155 (1986).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Simon, supra note 3, at 132.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 27-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business reasons attributed to the insurance crisis.
26. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tort
system factors as it relates to the insurance crisis.
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1. Insurance Industry Factors
Two main reasons underlying the insurance crisis have been attributed to the insurance industry: price wars, and the absence of
government regulation. First, during the late 1970's and early 1980's,
insurance companies engaged in price wars.2 Many insurance
cpmpanies cut premium rates in efforts to attract new business.2"
The insurers, however, did not base coverage and premium rates on
consumer risk.2 Rates, therefore, were severely discounted and coverage became easily attainable.3 0 Insurers took advantage of inflated
interest rates by investing this additional money received as premiums.31 The investments produced a high enough rate of return to
a greater profit than if they had adhered
cover claims and still make
3 2
to the normal practice.
Inevitably, interest rates fell and claims increased. 3 As a result,
the high rate of returns dropped. 4 As a consequence of this poor
business judgment, premiums skyrocketed, and insurers arbitrarily
cancelled various insurance lines and marginal customers, and did
not issue many new policies. 5 The insurance industry claimed that
27. Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 10. It is undisputed that the price wars
are part of the cause of the crisis. The dispute arises over how predominant a role the
price wars have played. Doug Hallet, a specialist in insurance regulation, stated that
the insurance industry is cyclical, therefore, price wars will result every few years. See
Chiang, Law in Business, L.A.D.J., Aug. 5, 1985 at 3, col. 1. State Senator William
Marovitz found that "the current crisis is due to the boom and bust nature of the
industry itself." Marovitz, supra note 13, at 2. An insurance spokesman, however,
stated that even though price was a cause of the crisis, lawsuits increased during the
same time period. Keading, Insurance Regulation Proposal Criticized, Chi. D. L.
Bull., June 6, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
28. Marovitz, supra note 13, at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 10. But see Beyler and Kelley, Large Damage Awards and the Insurance Crisis:Causes, Effects and Cures, 75
ILL. B.J. 140, 144 (1986) (the authors view this event from a different perspective).
32. Marovitz, supra note 13, at 2.
33. Id. This started in 1979 and peaked in 1983 when interest rates dropped. Id.
The average return on net worth was 8.3% in 1983. Id. The return dropped to 1.7%
in 1984. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 10. Contra Beyler and Kelley,
supra note 31, at 144. The authors state that there is a temptation to overprice, but
that the temptation is limited by the competitive market and state regulation. Id.
They claim that "[u]nless insurers are running a cartel that is operating as successfully as OPEC's [cartel] once did, the temptation to overprice during [low cash flow]
market cannot possibly explain the high premium increases we are seeing." Id.
This Comment suggests that the insurance industry may have a cartel similar to
OPEC's. First, the industry is exempt from anti-trust laws. See infra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text. Thus, monopolies and price agreements are possible. Id. Second,
many states, including Illinois, do not have any rate regulations. Third, insurance
coverage is needed as much as oil is needed in order to function in the modern world.
See infra notes 115, 127-130 and accompanying text.
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its lost profits justified its response to rapidly declining interest
rates.3 6 Statistics reveal, however, that the insurance industry was
7
3
never in any threat of financial danger.

Second, the government does not heavily regulate the insurance
industry. Nationally, because insurance companies are exempt from

anti-trust laws, they are free to fix rates at any level.3" Although this
practice might not be widespread, the continuation of exorbitant
premiums suggests that insurers are not competing with each
other.39 The federal government allows the states to control the insurance companies. 0 States, however, do not exhibit much control.
Indeed, Illinois insurers are the least regulated in the country.4 '
Not only are Illinois insurance companies able to set their own
rates, they may also arbitrarily raise rates and cancel policies.42 Furthermore, insurance companies can withhold a substantial amount
of financial information from both consumers and the government. s
36. The insurance industry claims that it lost 5.5 billion dollars in 1985. See
Keading, supra note 27, at 14.
37. The Illinois Public Action Council ("IPAC") found that the industry had a
6.6 billion dollar net profit in 1985. See Lewis, The Case Against Caps, 75 ILL. B.J.
164-65 (1986). IPAC also contends that in 1984, Illinois insurers received almost one
billion dollars more in premiums than losses. See id. In 1985, insurance stocks outperformed the Dow average by 80%. See Marovitz, supra note 13, at 2. The Government Accounting Office explained that the property/casualty lines of the insurance
industry tripled its assets to 250 billion dollars from 1974-1984. Id. Twelve billion
dollars in profits were earned during that time. Id. Aetna's stock jumped from 38
dollars per share to 86 dollars per share in the course of one year. Id. Aetna's first
quarter profit in 1986 increased 348%; Kempers' increased 210%. See Transcript Debates, 84th Gen. Ass., at 51, June 30, 1986 (statement of Rep. Levin) [hereinafter
Levin].
38. See Simon, supra note 3, at 132. See also infra note 40.
39. Id.
40. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 20 U.S.C.. §§ 1011-15 (1984), exempts insurance companies from anti-trust laws. Because it also exempts insurance companies
from federal regulation, the states can regulate the industry. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1011, 1012.
The United States Supreme Court has construed section 1012(b) as preempting federal regulation of "insurance business," not as preempting the "business of insurance." See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
41. Transcript Debates, 84th Gen. Ass., at 104, June 30, 1986 (statement of Sen.
Marovitz) [hereinafter Marovitz]. Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter
Shaefer stated that "the regulation of insurance companies is one of the weakest
spots in [Illinois] government." See Quinn, supra note 13, at 3. For example, two
proposals that have been consistently rejected are the proposed requirements that
insurance policies be written in plain language and that disclosures of rates of returns
on the savings components of whole life insurance policies be required. Id.
42. See Lewis, supra note 37, at 165. See also Transcript Debates, Ill. Senate, at
90, June 30, 1986 (statement of Senator Newhouse) [hereinafter Newhouse].
43. See Transcript Debates, 84th Gen. Ass., at 108, June 30, 1986 (statement of
Sen. Rock) [hereinafter Rock]. One example, Rock noted, was that dividends paid to
shareholders are written as underwriting losses. Id. Normally, dividends are treated
as profits.
When the insurance industry representatives met with the Illinois legislature to
discuss solutions to the crisis, the legislators requested documentation substantiating
the industry's needs. Marovitz, supra note 13, at 14. They asked for closed claim files,
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One analyst of the crisis asserted that there is not even enough industry information available to determine the exact cause of the crisis." The industry's failure to produce information that would justify its practices has lead many analysts to believe, that the
insurance industry manufactured the crisis.4
2.

Tort System Factors

Another theory advanced to explain the insurance crisis is that
the ever-changing tort system has caused an increasing amount of

tort litigation and excessive jury awards."' Consequently, insurance
companies claim that they can no longer accurately predict the risks
involved in extending coverage to consumers.4 7 As a result, insurers
contend that they must raise rates and cancel coverage.

The first component of this theory is that the extraordinary increase in the amount of tort litigation results from court-created
torts, and the erosion of well-established standards of negligence."
In support of this allegation, insurers assert that there has been a
forty-seven billion dollar increase in the number of reported claims
over the past five years. 49 Since 1950, the tort system's total cost has
which the insurance industry's financial outlook is based upon, and for other books
and records to decipher the crisis. Id. Every time the legislators requested, the industry refused. Id. The industry claimed that the documentation was unavailable and
would be difficult to prepare. Id.
44. See Brunelli, New Head of ABA Panel Looks to Illuminate Insurance
Problems, Chi. D. L. Bull., Aug. 8, 1986, at 1, 14.
45. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 43, at 94.
46. See, e.g., Willard, Does the Tort System Need an Overhaul?, A.B.A. J. July
1986, at 36. The insurance industry's argument is that tort law was previously composed of a predictable set of rules, in which negligent defendants would compensate
clearly identified plaintiffs. Id. Recently, however, negligence laws have eroded, and
standards such as "assumption of risk" and "contributory negligence" have disappeared. Id. Courts are creating new standards and presumptions, which are overcoming causation requirements. Id. Consequently, the industry claims that the size of
jury awards have ballooned enormously and the frequency of lawsuits has increased
tremendously. Id.
47. Id. at 37. See also Pike, Panel Discussion on the Insurance Crisis, 75 ILL.
B.J. 160, 161 (1986). Pike stated that the ability to predict exposure to risk and to
charge a rate commensurate with that exposure is the "bedrock of insurance pricing."
Id. Stated simply, the risk is the chance the insurer takes that the insured will not be
sued. The industry claims that years ago it could accurately predict this risk because
negligence laws were definite and the standards for causation were narrowly construed. Id. Because negligence laws have changed and causation has broadened, the
insurers cannot accurately predict their exposure to risk, i.e., the chance of the insured being sued. Id. As a result, it becomes difficult to set rates for the insured, and
more difficult to judge whether to insure someone. Id. This problem is especially evident in product liability, medical malpractice, and governmental liability situations.
Id.
48. See supra note 46 for a general discussion of the standards that were
eroded.
49. Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 1.
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grown three times faster than the Gross National Product.50 Medical
malpractice and product liability are the two main areas of tort law
where the increase in litigation is most striking. 1 Several reasons
advanced for the increase in these areas of litigation, as well as other
tort law areas, are the adoption of strict liability and comparative
negligence, the existence of joint and several liability, the erosion of
sovereign immunity, and the relaxed standards of causation.5 2 Additionally, judicial recognition of new torts such as negligent infliction
of emotional distress, retaliatory discharge and bad faith refusal to
settle claims has contributed to the increased number of lawsuits.5"
The second component of this crisis theory is that extraordinary
jury awards have caused financial hardships on insurance companies. In Cook County, for example, the average jury award doubled
between 1960 and 1979.4 This jump, however, is due to a increase in
only the top ten percent of awards; the lower ninety percent has
remained constant.5" Much of this increase has been attributed to
the availability of punitive damages. Punitive damage awards alone
have increased 700% since 1980.56
Another factor attributed to excessive jury awards is the "deep
pocket" theory of tort recovery. 57 Rather than suing the actual
tortfeasor, plaintiffs seek out large businesses and municipalities
which have only a minor connection in the accident and join them as
defendants. The joint and several liability rule requires these defendants, if found to be remotely at fault, to pay the entire judgment.5 8 Studies indicate that plaintiffs can recover three times as
much from a governmental defendant and four times as much from
a corporate defendant than from an individual defendant. 59
50.

Beyler and Kelley, supra note 31, at 140-41 (citing Sturges,

THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 23 1983)).
TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS,

THE COST OF

See also PETERSON AND PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY:
Cook County, Illinois, 1960-1979, VII, VIII, IX

(Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice, 1982).
51. Simon, supra note 3, at 132. Medical malpractice suits in New York increased 10.9% between 1983 and 1985. Id. Product liability cases litigated in federal
courts increased 75% in the last decade. Id.
52. Beyler and Kelley, supra note 31, at 150.

53. id.
54. Peterson and Priest, supra note 50, at 21. Although inflation is factored out,
this statistic is still very misleading because only the top 10% of jury awards doubled,

thus raising the overall averages. Id. at 20-23. All other sizes of jury awards have
remained constant in the 20-year period. Id. The overall median of jury awards, including the top 10%, has also remained constant. Beyler and Kelley, supra note 31,

at 148.
55.
56.
A.B.A. J.
57.
58.
59.
DEEP

See supra note 54 for a short overview of these statistics.
Keading, supra note 27, at 2. See Frank, Trends in Million-DollarVerdicts,
Sept. 1984, at 52.
Too Much for Too Little, supra note 12, at 3.
Id.
See Beyler and Kelley, supra note 31, at 153, (citing CHIN AND PETERSON,
POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 43 (Rand
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II. THE ACT
Governor Thompson signed Senate Bill 1200 into law on September 26, 1986.0 It was then titled "an Act in relation to the insurance crisis." ' 61 Governor Thompson's statement that the Act would
not lower insurance rates or significantly affect the availability of
insurance was consistent with the view of many legislators.6 2 Nevertheless, when Thompson signed the Act, he stated that "[to] veto
the bill would be like asking soldiers who suffered casualties in a
pitched battle to retreat from minimal gains without reason before
the next battle starts."6 8 The Act consists of twenty-seven articles.
This Comment, however, will discuss only eight of the major articles."4 Four articles represent tort reform measures which apply to
negligence actions resulting from bodily injury or physical property
65
damage, and product liability cases based on strict tort liability;
the other four constitute insurance regulations.6 6
First, under this Act, punitive damages can only be added to a
plaintiff's complaint after a hearing. 7 The trial judge has discretion
to allocate punitive damages, if awarded, among the plaintiff, his attorney and the Department of Rehabilitation." Second, the Act has
put a restriction on joint and several liability, thereby mitigating the
"deep pocket" theory.69 Under this Article, a defendant who is
found less than twenty-five percent at fault will be liable only for his
share of the awarded non-medical damages.70 Third, the Act effectuates the collateral source rule. 7' The plaintiff's damages will be reduced by the amount of medical benefits he receives in excess of
twenty-five thousand dollars. Fourth, the Act modifies the comparative negligence rule, so that a plaintiff who is greater than fifty perCorp. Inst. for Civil Justice 1985)).
60. Pub. L. No. 84-1431 (1986) (CCH).
61. Id.
62. Letter from Governor James Thompson to the 84th General Assembly (September 26, 1986) (signing into law Senate Bill 1200).
63. Id.
64. A major article in the Act that will not be discussed in this Comment is
article one, which gives various immunities to local government.
65. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text for an explanation of the enacted tort reforms.
66. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text for an explanation of the enacted insurance regulations.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-604.1. The complaint may be amended if the
plaintiff establishes at the pre-trial hearing that there is a "reasonable likelihood" of
proving sufficient facts at trial to support the award of punitive damages. Id.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1207. The judge may also use his discretion to
determine if a jury award for punitive damages is exclusive, and enter remittitur if so.
Id.
69.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,

2-1117.

70. Id. The exception to this new rule applies to defendants who discharge pollutants into the environment. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, 2-1118.
71.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,

2-1205.1.
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cent at fault will be prohibited from recovering any damages at all."
Four articles of the Act constitute the major portion of the insurance regulatory provisions. First, insurers must provide customers with a complete record of their claim history upon the insured's
request, the cancellation of the insured's policy, or the non-renewal
of such a policy. 3 Second, the Act provides that insurers give the
Department of Insurance ninety days notice of, as well as reasons
for, terminating a substantial portion of certain lines of insurance.7
Third, the Act requires insurers to give sixty days notice of cancellation or failure to renew a particular policy.s It also requires sixty

days notice where the insurer intends to increase a premium by
more than thirty percent.s Finally, the Act requires insurance companies to provide the Department of Insurance with more information so that the government can study the relationship between insurance premiums and the insurer's profits and expenses.7 This
portion of the Act was intended to encourage competition between
insurance companies and to establish a "mechanism to ensure the
provision of adequate insurance at reasonable rates.""
III.

ANALYSIS

The alleged compromise between the insurance industry and
the legal community greatly benefits the insurance industry. As a
result, the Act reflects the legal community's concession to a powerful insurance lobby." Apparently, the citizens and businesses of Illi72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, $ 2-1116. Where a plaintiff is not greater than 50%
at fault, damages will be reduced in the proportion to the amount of his fault. Id. The
court will instruct the jury that a plaintiff cannot recover damages if he is greater
than 50% at fault. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-1107.1
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, $ 755.10a. The loss information from the three previous policy years must be provided within thirty days of the insured's request. Id. The
insurer must provide the dates and descriptions of occurrences, and total amounts of
payments and reserves. Id. 1 755.10a(1)(a),(b),(c). The Director of Insurance has the
power to exclude the automatic providing of loss information for any line of insurance
where it can be shown that the information would not be needed. Id. 755.10a(3). The
loss information provided is not subject to discovery. Id. 1755.10a(5).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 755.11a. The statute does not apply to life, accident
and health, fidelity and surety, and ocean marine policies. Id. The notice must include all data relied upon by the insurer for terminating the line and disclose whether
the insurer offers, and will continue to offer, the line in other states. Id.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 755.17a.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 755.17a(b).
77. The Insurance Cost Containment Act is codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 11
1065.901-906. Paragraphs 1065.902 and 1065.903 promulgate the Director of Insurance's duties. Among his duties is to report to the General Assembly. Id. These reports must include his findings and recommendations for cost containment. Id. 11
1065.902,3. The data collected may include: number of policies; premiums collected;
losses paid; number of claims; net underwriting losses; net investment income; and
any other information collected by the Director. Id. 1 1065.904.
78. Id. $ 1065.904.
79. As of 1985, the insurance industry had 61 highly trained experts lobbying in
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nois have taken a back seat on this issue.
As it stands, the Act will not relieve Illinois' insurance crisis.
Reduction in rates and increased coverage, either through the industry's own initiative or through regulation, is what is needed. Even
though Illinois needs tort reform, such reform will not solve the crisis because the tort system is not the source of the problem. The
Act, in the end, will only serve to increase the already excessive
profits of the insurance industry.
A.

The Act and Tort Reform

The tort system has very little relationship, if any, to the insurance crisis. Advocates of tort reform complain that tort doctrines,
supposedly reformed under this Act, serve as a catalyst to the insurance crisis, alleging that tort doctrines increase both the number of
lawsuits filed, and the amount of damages awarded.80 There is no
proof, however, that these doctrines, or the tort system in general,
directly caused the insurance crisis. In Cook County, for example,
not only has the number of lawsuits filed per capita remained constant,s" but after taking inflationary factors into consideration, the
average jury award for seventy-five percent of the cases has remained constant."' Only the top ten percent of the highest jury
awards have caused the average jury award to increase.8 3 Otherwise,
the median jury award has remained constant.8 4
In many states that have implemented a tort reform system in
response to the insurance crisis, insurance rates continue to soar,
and insurance policies remain unavailable.8" For example, Pennsylvania's legislature enacted various local governmental immunities,
but insurance companies still continue to cancel policies.86 The Iowa
legislature modified its joint and several liability doctrine only after
the Illinois General Assembly. See Quinn, supra note 13, at 3. The industry spends
millions of dollars each year on lobbying. Id. Consumers, on the other hand, do not
have any special interest groups protecting their interests. Id. See also Transcript
Debates, 84th Gen. Ass., at 99-100, (June 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Barkhausen).
Senator Barthausen did not vote for the bill because it was a result of the insurance
industry's influence. Id.
80. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text for a discussion on the tort
reformers theory of the insurance crisis.
81. Marovitz, supra note 13, at 2.
82. See Peterson and Priest, spra note 50, at 20-23.
83. Id.
84. Beyler and Kelley, supra note 31, at 148.
85. Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 101. As of August 1986, eighteen states
had put caps on damages and nine states had limited punitive damages awards. Id.
Additionally, nine states now have structured payments for awards and collateral
source payments. See id. Some states that enacted tort reform have produced limited
relief. In most states, however, insurance rates are still rising. See id.
86. Marovitz, supra note 13, at 14.
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the insurance industry gave assurances that the county governments
would be able to obtain insurance coverage."7 Just one year later,
however, forty-one Iowa counties had their insurance cancelled.8
Unsuccessful tort reform is also evident in Canada. Canada has revised its entire tort system. 8 0 Nevertheless, premiums have risen
400% and some forms of coverage cannot be attained at any price.90
Although tort reform will not halt the crisis, the Act does contain several provisions which are necessary to reform the tort system
and which may have a positive impact on the crisis. Conversely,
there are several unfair provisions that will neither reform the tort
system nor have a positive impact on the insurance crisis. The best
reform in the Act is Article Three, which regulates punitive damage
awards. 9
1. Punitive Damages
Article Three, which attempts to reform punitive damage
awards will decrease the burden placed on the courts by frivolous
lawsuits, and will more accurately distribute damages. The Article
requires plaintiffs to amend their complaints to include punitive
damages only after a pre-trial hearing has demonstrated that there
is a reasonable likelihood that they can be proved up at trial. 92 It
also grants the trial court discretion to apportion the punitive damage award among the plaintiff, his attorney, and the Department of
Rehabilitation."3
The concerns regarding frivolous lawsuits, excessive awards, and
windfalls to plaintiffs have led reformers to assert that punitive
damages should be abolished.94 Punitive damages, however, are essential to our system of justice. Punitive damages are assessed for
wilful and wanton misconduct and are necessary to punish and deter
such conduct.9 5 If punitive damages were precluded, defendants, after weighing the cost of harm to plaintiffs against the benefit of engaging in the misconduct, would be more likely to engage in the mis87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of Article

Three.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 2-6041.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 2-1207.
94. See, e.g., Potter, Are Punitive Damages Getting Out of Control?, A.B.A. J.
Dec. 1984, at 16. (concerns involved with awarding punitive damages).
95. See Drummond, Punitive Damages, 75 ILL. B.J., 172, 173-75 (1986). For
cases in Illinois explaining this rule, see Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 334
N.E.2d 79, 94 (1975), and Skelley Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 338 11. App. 79,
86 N.E.2d 875, 881 (1949).
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conduct. Consequently, punitive damages are necessary to punish
and deter others from engaging in wilful and wanton misconduct.
Punitive damages, are not intended to compensate the plaintiff.96 A plaintiff, therefore, cannot complain about not receiving
punitive damages where he has already "been made whole." If all
punitive damage awards were to escheat to the State, plaintiffs

would have no additional incentive to seek punitive damages. Such a
result would permit the defendant to escape liability for wilful and
wanton misconduct. The Illinois legislature has codified an effective
solution to the "windfall" problem by granting courts the power to
apportion the damages among the plaintiff, his attorney, and the
Department of Rehabilitation. 97 This new rule serves the dual function of solving the windfall problem and deterring defendants from
misconduct.

There are several other proposals which would more effectively
reform tort law. First, implementation of structured awards would
prevent the hardship of a defendant paying a large punitive damage

award all at once, possibly threatening solvency."8 Second, in vicarious liability situations, punitive damages should not be assessed

against the principal-defendant unless he is found culpable for his
own wilful and wanton misconduct. 99
None of these tort reform measures significantly affect the insurance crisis. In Illinois, punitive damages can only be insured
against in vicarious liability situations, thus, the assessment of punitive damages does not impact heavily upon insurance rates and coverage.100 The new Act will, however, cause insurers to spend less
time and money litigating frivolous lawsuits. First, the punitive
damage pre-trial hearing requirement places a heavier burden on
96. Drummond, supra note 95, at 173 (citing Hawk v. Ridgeway, 33 Ill. 472
(1864)).
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1207.
98. A structured punitive damage award would allow a judge to divide the
award and would permit the defendant to make payments over a period of time. See
Drummond, supra note 95, at 175. The judge would consider factors such as the defendant's ability to pay the award, attorneys fees, how much of award is going to the
Department of Rehabilitation, and the need to deter and punish. Id. An argument
against structured awards is that the plaintiff or receivers of the award are not actually getting the amount awarded because they are losing interest on the money as a
result of being paid over a period of time.
99. This requirement, entitled the complicity rule,is followed by Illinois. Tolle
v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 42 11. App. 3d 473, 356 N.E.2d 625 (1976). Drummond would strike the complicity rule, thus not holding the principal liable for any
punitive damages. See Drummond, supra note 95, at 174-75.
100. Shumaier and McKinsey, The Insurabilityof Punitive Damages, A.B.A. J.
Mar. 1986, at 69. Insurers in Illinois can not claim that punitive damages are causing
hardships on them because they do not have to pay any claims for punitive damages
unless vicarious liability is at issue.
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the plaintiff to prove wilful and wanton misconduct."'1 Second, because of these additional burdens placed upon the plaintiff, cases
may not even be filed and many controversies will be settled out of
court. Finally, because insuring punitive damages prevents the deterrence effect on wilful and wanton misconduct, punitive0 2damages
should either be insured at very high rates, or not at all.1
2. Joint and Several Liability
The joint and several liability doctrine has evoked much debate,
primarily because of the "deep pocket" theory." 3 On the one hand,
the law mandates that a plaintiff be made whole. On the other hand,
assessing the entire award against a defendant who is only partially
at fault creates an inequitable result. The new Act considers both of
these factors. The relevant provision allows total recovery for medical damages,' 0 while not unjustly punishing the defendant. As long
as the plaintiff is relieved from paying incurred medical expenses, it
is not unreasonable to impose a higher threshold, such as fifty percent, for non-medical damages upon defendants in a joint and several liability setting.
Although it has been questioned in other jurisdictions, this reform may have an effect on the insurance crisis. In 1984, members of
the insurance industry told Iowa legislators that if it abolished the
joint and several liability doctrine as it applied to municipalities,
insurance coverage would be made available."0 " In 1985, insurance
companies cancelled the insurance policies of forty-one Iowa counties. 106 The joint and several liability reform, however, may have an
indirect effect on the insurance crisis. The reform might play a role
in the negotiating processes between plaintiffs and defendants.0 7
First, more lawsuits may be settled out of court, thus lowering the
litigation costs. Second, more lawsuits may be settled for the true
value of the defendant's fault. If a defendant's liability is close to
the twenty-five percent threshold, a plaintiff will settle out of court
and not risk losing non-economic damages.
101. The judge at a separate pre-trial hearing may ensure that the "wilful and
wanton conduct" requirement be ascertained. If there were no such requirement, the
standard for wilfulness and wantonness might not be met at trial.
102. If punitive damages were insured, a person or business would not be deterred from wilful or wanton conduct because he would have nothing to lose.
103. Insurance Wars, supra note 3, at 1. See also Transcript Debate, 84th Gen.
Ass., at 59 (June 30, 1986) (statement of Rep. Hosser).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-1117.
105. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. See Transcript Debate, Ill. Senate, at 87, June 30, 1987 (statement of Senator Berman) [hereinafter Berman].
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3. Collateral Source Rule
The Act has also modified the collateral source rule. Under the
Act, a plaintiff's judgment will be reduced by the amount of medical
benefits he receives in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars." The
new collateral source rule was enacted to prevent a windfall to the
plaintiff. The rule not only produces inequitable results, but will not
have any effect on the insurance crisis.10 9 By reducing the plaintiffs'
awards, the rule punishes the plaintiff for being injured. The defendant, who caused the injury, escapes liability by not having to
pay damages. In order to rectify this harsh result, defendants should
indemnify the plaintiff's insurance company for all medical bills. " '
Consequently, the plaintiff is made whole, his insurance company is
reimbursed, and the defendant pays for his liability.
The new collateral source rule will not reduce rates or increase
coverage. Essentially, the rule shifts the burden of paying for liability from the defendant to the plaintiff's insurance company. Thus,
the insurer is punished because it has to pay for the defendant's
negligence. This can only have an adverse impact upon the plaintiff's insurance rates and coverage.
4. Modified Comparative Fault
The Act creates a modified comparative fault rule. This rule
bars the plaintiff from recovery if he is more than fifty percent at
fault."' The rule is unconscionable. Justice demands that a defendant must compensate an injured plaintiff for his share of fault. Further, a plaintiff should be compensated for whatever degree he is not
at fault. Advocates of the abolition of the joint and several liability
doctrine cannot support a modified comparative fault rule because
the same principle supports both arguments. If it is unfair to make a
defendant pay more than his share of fault, then it is unfair to bar a
plaintiff from recovering damages that are not the result of his own
fault.
Most likely, the new rule will not save defendants money from
judgment because the judge will instruct the jury the plaintiff is
barred from recovery if he is more than fifty percent at fault. The
jury, however, may find for the plaintiff where his degree of fault is
slightly over the fifty percent threshold. For example, under the jury
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-1205.1.
109. This collateral source rule applies to past medical bills only, and not for
future medical bills that an insurer or an employer would cover. See Transcript Debate, 84th Gen. Ass., at 56 (June 30, 1986) (statement of Rep. Pederson). Twenty-five
thousand dollars is also a high threshold for most accidents. Id.
110. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1205.1(w).
111. Id. 2-1116.

19871

Illinois Tort Reform Act

173

nullification principle, if a plaintiff is found to be between fifty and
sixty percent at fault, the jury may decide to only find him fortynine percent at fault. If the previous pure comparative fault rule
applied, the defendant would only have to pay forty percent;
whereas, now, he would have to pay fifty percent. Like efforts to
reform joint and several liability, however, this rule could prove to
be an effective negotiating tool.
The tort system, specifically under the reforms of this Act, will
not solve the insurance crisis. The collateral source rule and the
modified comparative fault rule will not positively impact the crisis.
The punitive damage and joint and several liability reforms may
have only an indirect impact. A large insurance company declared
that if the Illinois legislature were to adopt the industry's tort reform package, insurance rates would decline eleven percent."2 Considering the fact that Illinois businesses are experiencing rate increases of 250% and are declaring bankruptcy because they cannot
afford coverage," 8 such tort reform will not resolve the insurance
crisis. This becomes more evident after considering the fact that
several insurance companies experienced anywhere from a 210% to
a 348% increase in profits in the first quarter of 1986.""
The solution to the insurance crisis lies in governmental regulation of the insurance industry. Ordinarily, governments should not
regulate business. With certain industries, however, such regulation
is essential. Insurance coverage has become a necessity in order to
live and function in this country today."" For example, construction
112. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text for additional statistics.
113. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text for additional statistics.
114. See supra note 37.
115. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 2344 (McKinney 1985). In enacting further legislation, the legislature enunciated the effects of this crisis:

The legislature hereby finds and declares that the state is in the midst of an
insurance crisis which affects all aspects of the public and private sectors. Day
care centers, not-for-profit organizations, volunteer groups, businesses, governmental entities, housing and transit authorities, professionals and others have
experienced sudden and inexplicable cancellations and nonrenewals of their liability insurance policies with little, if any, notice. In other cases, policyholders
and the public have been confronted by skyrocketing premiums or reductions
in coverage. These events have disastrous effects on a multitude of public entities, groups and individuals, and threaten to undermine economic development
and the delivery of essential and necessary services to residences, consumers
and businesses throughout New York state. Because critical coverages have become unavailable or unaffordable, a comprehensive, balanced approach is imperative to provide stability and safeguard the public interest.
The legislature further finds and declares that, by the enactment of the
provisions of this act [L.1986, c.220], it is the intent of the legislature to fulfill
its constitutional obligation to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the
people of this state. It is imperative that this state provide stability, security
and certainty for commercial risk, public entity and professional liability insurance policyholders and the public at large by the enactment of this act.
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companies cannot bid for governmental projects unless they have insurance. Business owners that do not have insurance risk losing all
their personal belongings. It is only natural for insurers to take advantage of this situation and to try to make as much profit as they
can. Consequently, the insurers need to be regulated.
B.

Insurance Regulation

The insurance regulatory provisions of the Act lay a foundation
for insurance industry reform. These regulations, however, are only
nominal. They will prevent neither arbitrary policy cancellations nor
exorbitant rate increases. A system that will directly curb the insurance crisis, while preserving a stable market, must include provisions for rate regulation, hearing boards, and guidelines prescribing
these procedures.
The regulations enacted are only nominal and represent a
"smoke screen" for necessary regulation. During the Senate debates,
Senator Rock stated that the Act contained a "whole host of measures aimed at the insurance industry," created to afford the Department of Insurance the necessary information to suggest to members of the insurance industry "that they watch their practices." '
He professed that the insurance industry has freely agreed to this
measure.1 17 Considering the fact that the industry has prevented
disclosure of its policies for so long, to suddenly profess a willingness
to freely relinquish information and control suggests that these provisions are not regulatory at all. " 8 As further support for this proposition, the insurance lobby is probably one of the most powerful
in the state.1 9
First, the Act mandates that insurers provide customers with a
complete record of their claim history either upon cancellation, nonrenewal or their request.'20 This regulation was enacted so that the
customer could present his record to another insurer after he has
been cancelled.' The regulation neither prevents arbitrary cancellations nor prohibits nonrenewals. Because Illinois does not have established criteria for cancellations based upon claim history, an insurer can cancel policies for any reason. This regulation also gives
the insurance director the power "to exclude the automatic providing of [claim history] at the time of cancellation . . . where it can be
116. Rock, supra note 43, at 79.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Marovitz, supra note 41, at 104-05. The legislature could not obtain information from the insurance industry during the medical malpractice crisis in
the 1970's. Id.
119. See supra note 89.
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 755.10a(1).
121. Transcript Debates, 84th Gen. Ass., at 6, June 30, 1986.
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shown that the information is not needed."' 22 Thus, the consumer is
given a limited right which can easily and arbitrarily be taken away.
Second, the Act requires insurance companies to give ninety
days notice of, and reasons for, terminating a line of insurance or a
substantial portion thereof.'2 8 This regulation is of little significance
mainly because it is unlikely that an insurance company will terminate an entire line or substantial portion of either property or casualty insurance. Insurance companies can continue to arbitrarily cancel, without notice, any portion of an insurance line considered to be
less than substantial. Twenty percent can be considered less than
substantial, but considering the number of citizens and businesses in
Illinois, twenty percent will have a great effect.
Third, the Act requires insurers to give sixty days notice for
cancellation or nonrenewal of policies, as well as for an increase of
thirty percent in premium rates."' The insurer, however, does not
have to give reasons for the cancellation. This regulation only benefits the consumer by providing time to acquire another policy.
Fourth, the Act confers power upon the Director of Insurance to
obtain what previously was inaccessible insurance industry information.' 28 This may be the only regulatory provision which does have
an impact on the crisis. This section of the Act also requires the
Director to report his findings to the legislature. This requirement
should provide a further check on the industry. 2 ' Hopefully, this
information will lay a foundation for further reform.
Further industry reform must be implemented because insurance coverage has become a necessity in modern society. 27 Illinois'
citizens, for example, spend ten cents out of every dollar for insurance. ' After food, housing and taxes, it is the largest household
expenditure. 2 For many businesses, insurance has become their
largest expenditure. 2 0 In reality, insurance has become a public
utility.
Thus, the Department of Insurance should regulate the insurance industry for the same reasons that the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC") regulates motor carriers and electric companies. Insurance companies are similar to motor carriers in two ways: first, in
122.
123.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, T 755.10a(3).
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 73, 755.11a.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. $ 755.17a, b.
See Id.
1065.900.1-6. See also supra note 77.
See Id.
1065.902, 1065.903.
See supra note 115.

128. Quinn, supra note 13, at 3.
129. Id. Illinois consumers spend five billion dollars every year on insurance.

130. See supra notes 17-24, 113 and accompanying text for statistics on the
expense of insurance to businesses.
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their numerosity, and second, in their practices prior to the regulation of the motor carrier industry. Motor carriers were regulated because of their mistreatment of the consumer, their change within the
industry, and because of the changing economic conditions.' Moreover, insurance companies are similar to electric companies because
both insurance and electricity are necessary."' Consequently, without regulation, these industries can easily exploit the consumer.
States such as New York and Florida have already recognized
these similarities and have established a regulatory system. 3 ' In order for Illinois to set up regulations similar to those of the ICC, New
York and Florida, it must provide for three essential elements: rate
regulation; hearing boards; and rules that will guide these procedures. These elements, along with the requirements enacted, will
prevent unreasonable rate increases and arbitrary cancellation of
policies, thus terminating the insurance crisis.
The first essential element is rate regulation. Rate standards
should not be unfairly discriminatory, unreasonable, unjust, excessive or inadequate.1 3 4 In order to achieve these standards, anti-competitive behavior must be prohibited and insurers should not be allowed to monopolize or conspire in any way that would prevent
competition. 35 The Department of Insurance ("Department") must
have the authority to approve or modify rates prior to the imposition of a thirty percent increase or decrease," 6 and must be notified
of all changes for data collection. In approving, rejecting, or modifying rates, the Department must analyze the insurer's financial position, past and prospective claims record, and existing market
7
circumstances.13
To avert unreasonable and unjust premiums and rate increases,
131. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, 18c-1101 (1986) (motor carriers).
132. See supra note 115.
133. The purpose of establishing rate regulation was to promote the public welfare; to prevent excessive rates, discriminatory practices, promote competition, and to
improve the availability and reliability of insurance. N.Y. INS. LAW § 2301 (McKinney
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.031 (West 1984).
134. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, 9-101 (1985) (public utilities); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 95-'/2,
18c-3205 (motor carriers); N.Y. INs. LAW, § 2303, FLA. STAT. ANN. §

627.031(2).
135. See, e.g., N.Y. INs.
136. See, e.g., ILL. REV.

LAW § 2316.
STAT. ch. 111-2/3, $ 9-102.

137. The factors considered for the insurer's financial position should include:

profits, reasonable margins for underwriting profits, dividends, savings, investment

income, loss reserves, and past and prospective expenses. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.072.
The factors that should be considered include: catastrophic hazards, total losses
and factors reasonably attributable to certain risks. Id.; N.Y. INS. LAW § 2304.
Other factors to consider should be the extent and nature of competition, sizes of

coverage, level range of rates and rate change among insurers, extent of consumer
complaints, volume of cancellations and nonrenewals, and changing conditions in the
economic, judicial and social environment. N.Y. INs. LAW § 2304.
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rates should be based on a graduated scale in conjunction with consumer classes.'18 Insureds should be classified into groups according
to their risk and claim history. For example, an insured with twenty
years of experience, who manufacturers aspirin and has only one minor claim against him should not receive the same rate increase as
an insured with five years of experience who manufactures a new
drug and has two claims against him. Where an insured has been
exploited or where the Department plans to approve or set rates, a
hearing should be held in order to further the ends of justice.
For example, where the industry requests thirty percent increases, a general hearing must be held."3 9 The Department's commissioners should conduct the hearing. Any interested party may
participate in the hearing for the purpose of determining, on the
basis of findings of fact and conclusions, whether rates should be
approved or modified."10 The Department, on its own, may also hold
a hearing to determine whether the rates are excessive or inadequate, and to determine whether and how consumer classes should
be reclassified."' As a result, the Department would have the power
to reduce rates that would yield unreasonable profits and to revise
inequitable classifications.
The Department must also establish boards to review individual
complaints."" The boards would consist of a three-member panel,
and would be deployed throughout the state." 8 These boards would
hear complaints on unjust rate increases and arbitrary nonrenewals,
as well as policy cancellations. The only parties that would participate in such a hearing would be the aggrieved party and the insurer.
The complainant, however, must have exhausted his remedies with
the insurer,"' and must meet certain requirements to have standing
for a board hearing. For example, an aggrieved consumer may only
bring an action for rate increases, cancellations or nonrenewals if the
insurer has provided him with coverage for three years or more, or
his rate is being increased by more than ten percent, and his claim
total has been less than a certain percentage of his total premiums
paid. On petition, these standing requirements may be waived by
the board. If the board holds for the complainant, it may issue a
cease and desist order for rate increases, cancellations and
138. N.Y. INs. LAW § 2304(c),(d); FLA.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAWS § 2344.
140.
141.
142.

STAT. ANN.

§ 627.072(2),(3).

Id.
See, e.g., id. § 2308.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 1, § 200 (hearing procedure of the Illinois

Commerce Commission).
143. The board need not consist of three members. The Department of Insurance should decide if one administrative law judge (hearing examiner) is appropriate.
144. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 2319(b) (every insurer must provide a hearing for
an aggrieved customer).
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nonrenewals."'5 If it finds that the insurer has charged excessive or
otherwise unjust rates, it may order the insurer to make due repara146
tion to the complainant and order that a just rate be charged.
The insurance consumers, however, should not and cannot rely
solely on the government for protection. When the Department of
Insurance proposes regulations and holds hearings, the insurance industry is always represented. As of 1985, the industry fielded sixtyone lobbyists in the Illinois General Assembly, where the consumers
had none. 4" Consumers, then, should establish a "Consumer Insurance Board" ("CIB"). The CIB would be a statewide not-for-profit
corporation, representing the interests of families, businesses and local governments. " s The CIB would hire full-time attorneys, actuaries and accountants who would monitor insurance companies, represent consumer interests to the Department of Insurance, and
lobby the General Assembly. " 9 CIB experts would also propose
standards for the insurance industry, counter their arguments and
unravel many of the industry's mysteries. 50
In order to reverse the current state of the insurance crisis, Illinois' citizens cannot wait for the new Act to take full effect. As previously discussed, the full effect of the Act would only indirectly affect the crisis. Consequently, the suggested governmental
regulations must be implemented without further delay.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Act will not relieve Illinois of its insurance crisis. Tort reform is not the answer for alleviating exorbitant rates and halting
arbitrary policy cancellations. The Act, however, does contain several provisions necessary for tort reform and to provide a foundation
for insurance regulation. Because insurance has become a necessity
in our society, the Illinois legislative committee should regulate the
insurance industry to halt the insurance crisis and to stabilize the
market. The Department of Insurance must be given the power to
control rates and provide hearings to protect the consumer. Consumers must also unite to have an effective voice in our state and to
145.
146.

See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-/3,
Id.

9-250 (1985).

9-252.

147. See supra note 79.
148. Letters from members to form Consumer Insurance Board of Illinois to
prospective members (Jan. 2, 1987) (explaining Consumer Insurance Board organization and practices). The Consumer Insurance Board (CIB) would be the first and only
organization representing insurance consumers.
Any Illinois resident would be able to become a full-voting member upon paying
an annual fee of five dollars. Id. No public funds would be used and citizens contributions would entirely fund CIB.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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prevent the insurance industry's domination of the Department of
Insurance and General Assembly. Until these events occur, Illinois'
attempt to resolve to insurance crisis will consist of too much tort
reform and too little insurance regulation.
Francis J. Bongiovanni

